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NOTES
Employment Law: Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton: A Clear Rule of
Deterrence or an Invitation to Litigate?. The Supreme
Court Rules on Employer Liability for Supervisory
Sexual Harassment
L Introduction
In the 1982 best-seller In Search of Excellence, management consultants Tom Peters
and Robert Waterman issued these simple words of advice to companies aspiring to
obtain the status of excellence: "Treat people as adults; [treat them as partners; treat
them with dignity; treat them with respect... ; [t]here [is] hardly a more pervasive
theme in... excellent companies than respect for the individual."' This advice, if
followed by every company, from upper to lower management, would do away with
the need for terms such as "tangible action," "aided in agency," and "quid pro quo"
in the employment context. This, however, is not the case. Whether the off-color joke,
sexual innuendo, or the supervisor who conditions a promotion on sex, it is inevitable
that some level of offensive behavior will always exist in the workplace that might
lead an individual to make a claim of sexual harassment. It is the litigation of such
claims that has brought about different terms and types of harassment, as well as
several differing theories of employer liability for supervisory harassment. In
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,' the
Supreme Court attempted to bring uniformity to the law of employer liability for
supervisory sexual harassment by implementing the policies that underlie Title VII.
In Burlington, the Court downplayed the judicially created distinction between quid
pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment, and established a rule that an
employer may be held vicariously liable for a supervisors sexual harassment of an
employee, even if the employee does not suffer any tangible change in her4
1. THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, JR., IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE: LESSONS FROM
AMERICA'S BEST-RUN COMPAmNES 238 (1982).
2. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
3. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
4. For purposes of this note, "her" or "she" will be used to refer to the employee, and "him" or "his"
to refer to the supervisor. It must be noted, however, that the gender of the plaintiff making a
discrimination claim under Title VII is not limited to females. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994);
Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 n.4 (3rd Cir. 1977); Rafford v. Randle
E. Ambulance Serv., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 316 (D.C. Fla. 1972). Additionally, in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998), the Supreme Court held that discrimination consisting of
same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII.
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employment status.5 In the companion case, Faragher, the Court provided an
affirmative defense to employers in cases where no tangible employment action is
taken. To escape liability, an employer must prove that it took reasonable care to
prevent and correct sexual harassment and that the employee unreasonably failed to
take advantage of the remedial procedures provided by the employer.6
In the wake of Burlington and Faragher, some employers might argue that the
Supreme Court has swung the pendulum too far to the left, necessarily forcing
employers to create a work environment where trust is nonexistent and video
surveillance and constant supervision are the norm.7 This is likely not the type of
environment Peters and Waterman had in mind when they envisioned the "excellent
company."8 However, employers need not worry nor become paranoid; the status of
excellence is still obtainable. The purpose of this note is to show that, with Burlington
and Faragher, the Supreme Court swung the pendulum to the middle and
implemented Congressional intent behind Title VII to promote conciliation, avert
litigation, and most importantly, deter sexual harassment in the workplace. Before
analyzing Burlington and Faragher, Part II of this note reviews the law of employer
liability for gender discrimination prior to Burlington and Faragher. Part M of this
note recounts the facts, holding, and reasoning of the Court in Burlington and
Faragher, while Part IV analyzes the Court's decisions in the two cases. Part V of this
note discusses the implications the cases have on Oklahoma law; specifically, how the
cases indirectly expose the inadequacies of Oklahoma's antidiscrimination laws. Part
VI concludes this note.
II. Law Prior to Burlington and Faragher
The development of the law on sexual harassment began with Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (the Act).9 Enacted primarily to address racial prejudice, the Act
made it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's... sex .. . ."" Because gender-based discrimination was a late addition
to Title VII, little legislative history was available to assist courts in applying Title VII
5. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
6. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93.
7. In his dissent, Justice Thomas opined that the only way for employers to prevent sexual
harassment and thus avo'd liability under the majority decisions in Burlington and Faragher is by taking
"extraordinary measures" such as video and audio surveillance, which would "revolutionize the workplace
in a manner incompatible with a free society." Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2273 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals opined the same, stating that employers
could not prevent harasr.ment in the workplace without going to extreme expense and sacrificing the
privacy of their employees by putting them under constant video surveillance. See Jansen v. Packaging
Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 511 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, CJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part),
affd sub nom, Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
8. See supra note I and accompanying text.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1994).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994).
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to sexual harassment claims." As a result, the case law that developed in the mid-
1970s on employer liability for sexual harassment was far from uniform. 2
Several cases illustrate this non-uniformity between the circuits. In Barnes v.
Costle,"3 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held,
as a general rule, an employer is chargeable under Title VII for the discriminatory acts
of its supervisory personnel. 4 The Barnes court recognized that an employer can
escape responsibility for the supervisor's conduct if the conduct "contravene[s]
employer policy without the employer's knowledge and the consequences are rectified
when discovered." 5 In Tompkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co.,6 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the standard for employer liability was
negligence, finding liability only when the employer has "actual or constructive
knowledge" of the supervisor's sexual harassment and "does not take prompt and
11. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986); Michael J. Phillips,
Employer Sexual Harassment Under Agency Principles: A Second Look at Mertor Savings Bank, FSB
v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1229, 1231 (1991) (arguing that agency principles should be abandoned
in determining questions of employer liability).
12. This note will not address what type of conduct is pervasive enough for an individual to bring
a sexual harassment claim. For a discussion of the type of conduct which triggers a claim, see Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) ("Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to
create... an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive... is beyond Title
Vii's purview."); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 ("For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual
Harassment with Respect, 111 HARv. L. R-v. 445 (1997) (advocating a respectful person standard for
defendants charged with hostile environment sexual harassment); Kellie A. Kalbac, Through the Eye of
the Beholder: Sexual Harassment Under the Reasonable Person Standard, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y,
Spring 1994, at 160 (examining the different approaches currently used by courts to determine whether
conduct was severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment); Toni Lester, The
Reasonable Woman Test in Sexual Harassment Law - Will It Really Make a Difference?, 26 IND. L.
REv. 227 (1993) (arguing for the application of the reasonable woman test to sexual harassment cases);
Leah R. McCaslin, Note, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: Defining the Plaintiffs Burden in Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment Claims, 29 TULSA LJ. 761 (1994) (examining plaintiffs burden in
sexual harassment cases); Joseph M. Pellicciotti, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Consideration
of Post-Vinson Approaches Designed to Determine Whether Sexual Harassment is Sufficiently Severe or
Pervasive, 5 DEPAUL Bus. LJ. 215 (1993) (considering approaches that have been developed by courts
in determining what conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive). Furthermore, this note will not discuss
employer liability for sexual harassment committed by co-employees. For a discussion of co-employee
sexual harassment, see Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 157 F.3d 55, 63 (2d Cir. 1998) (refusing to apply
Burlington and Faragher to cases of sexual harassment by co-employees); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
144 F.3d 664, 673 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding employer liability for sexual harassment by co-employee
if employer has actual or constructive knowledge of harassment, and fails to adequately respond to the
same); Henderson v. Whirlpool Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1244 n.4 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (refusing to
extend Burlington and Faragher to cases of sexual harassment by co-employees).
13. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
14. See id at 993.
15. Id. In a concurring opinion, Judge MacKinnon looked to agency law, reasoning that vicarious
liability should be imposed on employers only if the employee alleges that others in the agency aided
and abetted in retaliating against her, with knowledge of her complaints, thus ratifying the supervisory
harassment. See id at 1001.
16. 568 F.2d 1044 (3rd Cir. 1977).
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appropriate remedial action after acquiring such knowledge."'" In Miller v. Bank of
America," the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply a negligence standard
and instead turned to the doctrine of respondeat superior." The Miller court rejected
an employer's contention that it was not liable for its supervisor's harassment of an
employee because the employer had a grievance procedure and a policy prohibiting
harassment." The court reasoned that "the... rule, that an employer is liable for the
torts of its employees, acting in the course of their employment, ... [is] just as
appropriate here as in other cases ... where... the actor is the supervisor of the
wronged employee."'
In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued regulatory
guidance on sexual harassment and employer liability that essentially amounted to
strict liability." Under the EEOC guidelines, an employer is "responsible for its acts
and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment
regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even
forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or should
have known of their occurrence."'
As differing rules on liability emerged, two different forms of sexual harassment
also emerged - quid pro quo and hostile environment Generally, quid pro quo
harassment "occurs in situations where submission to sexual demands is made a
condition of tangible employment benefits," such as promotion or discipline.' Hostile
work environment harassment, sometimes called environmental harassment, occurs
where discriminatory comments, advances, touching, ridicule, and the like make the
workplace hostile or abusive
In a 1982 decision, Henson v. City of Dundee," the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals issued the first published federal decision recognizing the distinction between
quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment.' The court ruled that an employer
may be held vicariously liable for the acts of its supervisors in a quid pro quo sexual
harassment case, but an employer would be subject to a negligence standard in a
hostile environment case? The Eleventh Circuit found that when a plaintiff seeks
17. Id at 1048-49.
18. 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
19. See id. at 213.
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. See 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. §1604.11 (1998)).
23. 29 C.AR. § 1604.11(c) (1998).
24. See Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 HARV. 3.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 307 (1998) (advocating the abandonment of quid pro quo as a category of discrimination
under Title VII); see also CArTARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN:
A CASE OF SEX DISCRIAINATION 32 (1979). MacKinnon is credited with introducing quid pro quo to
the analysis of sex discrimination.
25. Bryson v. Chicago State Univ., 96 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 1996).
26. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993).
27. 682 F.2d 897 (1 th Cir. 1982).
28. See id at 908-9); see also Scalia, supra note 24, at 310.
29. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 910. In Henson, Barbara Henson, a dispatcher in the City of Dundee
. [Vol. 52:461
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to hold an employer responsible for the hostile environment created by a supervisor,
the plaintiff must show "that the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action."" The court found
that a plaintiff alleging sexual harassment can demonstrate an employer's knowledge
of the harassment by showing she complained to higher management about the
supervisor's harassment, or the plaintiff can impute constructive knowledge by
showing the pervasiveness of the harassment giving rise to the inference of
knowledge?'
The Henson court refused to impute liability automatically on employers because
the ability of any person to create a hostile environment is not necessarily enhanced
by any degree of authority which the employer has conferred on that individual.32
"When a supervisor gratuitously insults an employee, he generally does so for his
reasons and by his own means," because in creating a hostile environment, the
supervisor is acting outside the actual or apparent scope of his authority?3 Therefore,
the court reasoned that a supervisor's conduct "cannot automatically be imputed to the
employer any more so than can the conduct of an ordinary employee." '
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the reason for holding employers strictly
liable in quid pro quo cases is "readily apparent."35 When an employer gives
supervisory personnel authority to fire employees, the employer must also accept
responsibility to remedy any harm caused by the unlawful exercise of that authority.
"The modem corporate entity consists of the individuals who manage it, and little, if
any, progress in eradicating discrimination in employment will be made if the
corporate employer is able to hide behind the shield of individual employee action."37
Distinguishing quid pro quo from hostile environment harassment, the Henson court
reasoned that a quid pro quo case is "fundamentally different [because] the supervisor
uses the means furnished to him by the employer to accomplish the prohibited purpose
[and thus] acts within the scope of his actual or apparent authority to 'hire, fire,
discipline or promote."'35 Because the supervisor is acting within the scope of
authority with which the employer has entrusted him, each time a supervisor makes
an employment decision it is fair that his conduct be imputed to the source of his
authority.
police department, claimed that she was sexually harassed by her supervisor, the Dundee Chief of Police,
during her two years of employment. She alleged this harassment led to a hostile working environment
and ultimately to her resignation. The trial court ruled that Henson's claim of a hostile working
environment was not cognizable under Title VII. See id. at 900.
30. Id. at 905.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 910.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. ld. at 909.
36. See id.
37. Id. (quoting Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424, 436 (D. Utah 1971)).
38. Id. at 910 (quoting Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979)).
39. See id.
1999]
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With the groundl work sufficiently laid by the circuit courts, in 1986 the United
States Supreme Court decided Meitor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, marking the
first time the Supn-eme Court would consider what standard of liability should apply
to employers for sexual harassment committed by their supervising employees.
In Meritor, Mechelle Vinson brought a Title VII action against her employer,
Meritor Savings Btnk, and her supervisor, alleging the supervisor constantly subjected
her to sexual haramsment during her four years of employment with Meritor' The
federal district court found that Meritor could not be held liable for the acts of the
supervisor because it had a policy against discrimination. Furthermore, the district
court held that because Vinson never complained to anyone about the alleged
harassment, Meritor was without notice and thus could not be held liable.42
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision and held
that an employer is strictly liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment of subor-
dinates 3 The D.C. Circuit was the first circuit court to endorse and apply EEOC
guidelines," reasoning that supervisors are agents of employers for Title VII purposes
because, as supervisors, they have the authority and power to "coerce, intimidate and
harass."4 The Supreme Court affirmed the holding on different grounds.
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Meritor, then EEOC Chairman
and current Justice Clarence Thomas lobbied the Solicitor General to submit an
amicus brief that supported employers' The brief took the position of the district
court. With respect to hostile environment harassment claims, the brief argued:
[Aln employer should not be liable unless it knew or had reason to know
of the sexually offensive atmosphere .... [A]n employer in our view
should generdly be able to insulate itself from liability by publicizing a
policy against sexual harassment and implementing a procedure designed
to resolve sexual harassment complaints.
The amicus brief recognized vicarious liability for quid pro quo harassment under the
EEOC guidelines, but, as to hostile environment harassment claims, the brief stated
that "the usual basi3 for a finding of agency will often disappear. By definition, the
supervisor in such circumstances is not exercising, or threatening to exercise, actual
or apparent authority to make personnel decisions affecting the victim."4
40. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
41. See id. at 60.
42. See id. at 62.
43. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63.
44. See EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1998); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating
the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their
Supervisors, 81 CORNEI.L L. REv. 66, 123-24 (1995).
45. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
46. Justice Thomas wrote the dissenting opinion in Burlington and Faragher.
47. See Oppenheimer, supra note 44, at 124 (citing David G. Savage, Thomas Fought Workplace
Harassment, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 1991, at A6).
48. Id. at 126-27 (quoting Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission as Amici Curiae at 6-7, Meritor (No. 84-1979)).
49. Id. at 127 (quoting Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity
[Vol. 52:461
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol52/iss3/12
NOTES
The Supreme Court, however, expressly declined to issue a definitive rule on
employer liability, choosing instead to provide guidance to the courts?0 The Court
reasoned that Congress intended courts to look to principles of agency law for
guidance when determining employer liability under Title VII' In making this
pronouncement the Court cited generally the Restatement (Second) of Agency, but
the Court did not issue an explicit command that the Restatement be used as the
framework for evaluating sexual harassment under Title VII. The Court reasoned
that the court of appeals erred in its conclusion that "employers are always
automatically liable for sexual harassment" by supervisory employees because
"Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include any 'agent' of an employer surely
evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers
... are to be held responsible" under Title VI.' The Court went further, stating that
employers without notice are not necessarily insulated from liability, and the existence
of a grievance procedure that is not invoked by a plaintiff employee will not insulate
an employer from liability.'
After Meritor, courts continued to hold employers strictly liable for quid pro quo
sexual harassment.O Notwithstanding Meritor's guidance in hostile environment
harassment cases, courts continued to disagree about the appropriate standard for
employer liability in such cases." One year after the Meritor decision, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.,' looked to the Restatement
(Second) of Agency for the proper standard of employer liability in a hostile
environment case." The court found that an employer may be held liable if negligent
or reckless, or if the supervisory employee was aided in accomplishing the harassment
Commission as Amici Curiae at 22-24, Meritor (No. 84-1979)).
50. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72-73. The Court declined to make such a ruling based on the fact that
it was never decided whether Vinson's supervisor made any sexual advances toward Vinson, and whether
those advances, if any, were unwelcome or sufficiently pervasive enough to constitute a condition of
employment. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219-237 (1958).
53. See generally Anne C. Levy, The Change in Employer Liability for Supervisor Sexual
Harassment After Meritor: Much Ado About Nothing, 42 ARK. L. REV. 795 (1989) (showing why
application of agency principles should continue to hold employers to strict standards of liability for
supervisory sexual harassment); Katherine S. Anderson, Note, Employer Liability Under Title VIIfor
Sexual Harassment After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLuM. L. REv. 1258 (1987) (proposing
an approach to apply agency law principles in Title VII cases); Marlisa Vinciguerra, Note, The Aftermath
of Meritor: A Search for Standards in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE L.J. 1717 (1989)
(attempting to show the interplay between hostile environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment).
54. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (citing 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b)).
55. See id. Vinson claimed she never attempted to use Meritor's complaint procedure to report her
supervisor because she was afraid of him.
56. See Phillips, supra note 11, at 1237-38.
57. See id.; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2282 (1998) ("Since our
decision in Meritor, Courts of Appeals have struggled to derive manageable standards to govern
employer liability for hostile environment harassment perpetrated by supervisory employees.").
58. 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987).
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
1999]
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through the existence of the agency relation.w While the Tenth Circuit looked to the
Restatement as cited by the Supreme Court in Meritor, the Eleventh Circuit applied
the doctrine of respondent superior. In Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc.,6 the
Eleventh Circuit, while noting that the Meritor Court rejected automatic liability for
hostile environment harassment, held that an employer may be held liable for
supervisory harassment only where the employer "knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take prompt action against the supervisor."'
The Second Circuit adopted a more restrictive version of the standard adopted by
the Tenth Circuit. 'In Karibian v. Columbia University,; the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reasoned that under agency principles, employer liability could not be reduced
to a "universal formula."" The Second Circuit, while not adopting a negligence
theory, held that an employer is liable for supervisory sexual harassment "if the
supervisor uses his actual or apparent authority to further the harassment, or if he is
otherwise aided in accomplishing the harassment by the existence of the agency
relationship."" MeAmwhile, in Nichols v. Frank,' the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the proper analysis for finding employer liability in hostile environment cases
is what "management-level employees knew or should have known, not whether an
employee was acting within the 'scope of employment."67 The Supreme Court would
not attempt to clarify the issue until Burlington and Faragher.
Ill. Statement of the Cases
A. Facts
1. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
Kimberly Ellerth was an employee at Burlington Industries for a little over one
year, during which time she alleged she was subjected to constant sexual harassment
by her supervisor, 'red Slowik.' Ellerth emphasized three incidents as threats to her
tangible job benefits. TM The first incident occurred on a business trip where Slowik
invited Ellerth to a hotel lounge. Because Slowik was her supervisor, Ellerth
60. See id at 1418. In the Tenth Circuit, negligence remains a viable theory for imposing liability
on employers for supervisory sexual harassment after Burlington and Faragher. See, e.g., Lockard v.
Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1074 (10th Cir. 1998); Wright-Simmons v. City of Oklahoma City, 155
F.3d 1264, 1270-71 (lCth Cir. 1998).
61. 867 F.2d 1311 (lth Cir. 1989).
62. I at 1316.
63. 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994).
64. Id at 779.
65. Id
66. 42 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994).
67. Id at 508; see also Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Hirschfeld v. New Mexico
Corrections Dep't 916 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1990).
68. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2262 (1998). Slowik was a mid-level
manager with the power to make hiring and promotion decisions, subject to the approval of his
supervisor.
69. See id
70. See id
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claimed she felt compelled to accept his offer.7' Ellerth gave no encouragement to
the crude remarks made by Slowik, to which Slowik responded by stating, "You
know, Kim, I could make your life very hard or very easy at Burlington."' The
second incident occurred a year later when Ellerth was under consideration for a
promotion.' Slowik suggested during the promotion interview that Ellerth was not
"loose enough," a comment that was followed by his rubbing her knee.' The third
incident occurred when Ellerth made a work related phone call to Slowik, to which
he responded by stating, "I don't have time for you right now, Kim - unless you
want to tell me what you're wearing."
Throughout her employment, Ellerth was aware that Burlington maintained a policy
against sexual harassment and had read the policy in her employee handbook!6
Ellerth claimed, however, that she did not inform anyone of authority about Slowik's
conduct out of fear that it would jeopardize her job." A short time after the third
incident, Ellerth quit her job and filed a sexual harassment suit against Burlington,
alleging the company created a hostile work environment and forced her constructive
discharge in violation of Title VI. 8
The district court granted summary judgment to Burlington. Applying a negligence
standard, the district court found that Burlington neither knew nor should have known
about the harassing conduct:' The Seventh Circuit reversed in a decision that
produced eight differing opinions.'
2. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
Beth Ann Faragher worked for five years as a lifeguard for the City of Boca Raton,
Florida.!' The immediate supervisors of the lifeguards were Bill Terry and David
Silverman.' During the five year period Faragher was employed, both Terry and
Silverman repeatedly touched Faragher and other female employees without invitation,
and made comments and vulgar references to the women about their bodies and other
sexual matters. Faragher never formally complained to higher management about
Terry or Silverman, and although the City had a sexual harassment policy in place,
71. See id.
72. Id
73. See id.
74. d Ellerth received the promotion. See id
75. d
76. See id.
77. See id
78. See id. at 2263.
79. See id
80. See Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam), affid,
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). There was general agreement in the Seventh
Circuit regarding whether or not to impose liability on employers for supervisory sexual harassment;
however, there was a wide divergence on the court regarding the correct standard for imposing liability.
81. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2279 (1998).
82. See id at 2279.
83. See id at 2281.
1999]
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it failed to disseminate it to the lifeguards or their supervisors.' Faragher resigned
from her job and brought an action against Terry, Silverman, and the City of Boca
Raton, alleging that Terry and Silverman created a sexually hostile work environment
in violation of Title VII.L Faragher sought a judgment against the City asserting that
Terry and Silverman were the City's agents and their conduct amounted to
discrimination in the "terms, conditions, and privileges" of her employment.'
The district court held the City vicariously liable for the harassment committed by
Terry and Silvennan. The court reasoned that the harassment was pervasive enough
to support an inference that the City had knowledge or constructive knowledge of it,
and that the City was liable under agency principles because Terry and Silverman
were acting as the City's agents when they committed the acts." The Eleventh Circuit
reversed, holding that Terry and Silverman were acting outside the scope of their
employment when they engaged in the harassment and that they were not aided in
their actions by the agency relationship.'
B. Issue and Holding
The issue before the Supreme Court in Burlington was whether an employer may
be held vicariously liable when a supervisory employee "makes explicit threats to alter
a subordinates ternis or conditions of employment, based on sex, but does not fulfill
the threat."' The Court answered in the affirmative, holding that an employer may
be held vicariously liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment of an employee, even
if the employee does not suffer any tangible change in her employment status.'
In the companion case Faragher, the issue before the Court was the standard of
employer liability for supervisory sexual harassment in cases where the harassment
amounts to a hostile work environment.O ' The Court held that an employer is subject
to vicarious liability for supervisory sexual harassment creating a hostile work
environment.' The Court provided employers with an affirmative defense to liability
where an employer can prove that it took reasonable care to prevent and remedy the
harassment, and that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the
remedial procedures provided by the employer.93
84. See id.
85. See id. at 2279.
86. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
87. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 1563-64 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
88. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 11 F.3d 1530, 1537 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (en banc), rev'd, 118
S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
89. Burlington, 11:3 S. Ct. at 2265.
90. See id. at 2270.
91. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2279.
92. See id. at 2292-93.
93. See id. at 2293.
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C. Reasoning of the Court
1. Burlington
In Burlington, the Court began its analysis by downplaying the significance between
the terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment, noting that the terms
are not creatures of statute but rather first appeared in academic literature before
entering into the decisions of the courts of appeals. 4 According to the Court, the
terms are helpful in making "a rough demarcation" between cases in which threats are
carried out and cases in which they are not. 5 Beyond this, however, the Court found
that the terms are of "limited utility."" Specifically, the Court stated that "[t]o the
extent [the terms] illustrate the distinction between cases involving a threat which is
carried out and offensive conduct in general, the terms are relevant when there is a
threshold question whether a plaintiff can prove discrimination in violation of Title
VII. 'r The Court then turned to employer liability.
Justice Kennedy, delivering the opinion of the Court, began with the premise
established by the Court in Meritor. This premise was that Congress, in express terms,
"directed federal courts to interpret Title VII based on agency principles.""8 The
Court looked to the Restatement (Second) of Agency as a "useful beginning point for
a discussion of general agency principles."' Following the Restatement,"~n the Court
reasoned that an employer may be subject to liability when the supervisor's tortious
act is committed within the scope of employment."°' The Court determined, however,
that as a general rule supervisory sexual harassment is not conduct within the scope
of employment.' "
94. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2264.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2265. Justice Ginsburg agreed with the majority holding that the "labels quid pro quo
and hostile environment harassment are not controlling for purposes of establishing employer liability."
Id. at 2271 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2266.
100. The Restatement provides:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting
in the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the
scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was
reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the
existence of the agency relation.
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957).
101. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2266. The Restatement defines conduct to be within the scope
of employment when actuated by a purpose to serve the employer. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 228(1)(c) (1957).
102. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2267.
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The Restatement provides four situations in which an employer is subject to liability
for the torts of employees acting outside the scope of employment." The Court
looked most critically at two instances, the first being where "the master was negligent
or reckless."'" Under this situation, the Court found an employer is negligent and
therefore liable, under Title VII, if it knew or should have known about the
supervisor's conduct and failed to stop it. The Court went no further in analyzing
the negligence standard because Ellerth sought to invoke "the more stringent standard
of vicarious liability."
The second situation the Court analyzed under the Restatement is where "the servant
purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon
apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation.""'7 The Court divided this situation into two separate standards; first,
the "apparent authority standard" and second, the "aided in the agency relation
standard."'"4 The Court quickly dismissed application of the apparent authority
standard to Ellerth'!; case, finding that such a standard arises in rare situations when
it is alleged that "there is a false impression that the actor was a supervisor, when in
fact he was not.""9 The Court then turned to the "aided in the agency relation
standard," finding Che standard to require something more than the mere existence of
the employment relation itself."0
The Court reasoned that when a tangible employment action is taken against a
subordinate, the "aided in the agency relation standard" will always be met because
such action necessarily requires a company act that in most cases is documented and
subject to review by upper-management."' Thus, in such cases there is no question
that more than the "mere existence of the employment relation aids in the commission
of the harassment.""2 An employer empowering a supervisor as an agent with the
power to make economic decisions affecting subordinates cannot escape liability under
agency principles."'
Relying on the "aided in the agency relation standard," the Court went into great
detail to articulate a rule of vicarious liability for supervisory sexual harassment in
cases where tangible employment action is taken, stating:
A tangible employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic
harm. As a general proposition, only a supervisor, or other person acting
with the authority of the company, can cause this sort of injury ....
Tangible employment actions fall within the special province of the
103. See REsTATi'ENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219.
104. RESTATEMEWT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b).
105. See Burlingtoa, 118 S. Ct. at 2267.
106. Id.
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d).
108. See Burlingtoa, 118 S. Ct. at 2267.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id at 2269.
112. Id.
113. See id.
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supervisor. The supervisor has been empowered by the company as a
distinct class of agent to make economic decisions affecting employees
under his or her control."
4
The Court reasoned:
[W]hatever the exact contour of the aided in the agency relation standard,
its requirements will always be met when a supervisor takes a tangible
employment action against a subordinate. In that instance, it would be
implausible to interpret agency principles to allow an employer to escape
liability, as Meritor itself acknowledged."
s
The Court then turned to the more difficult task of determining whether the agency
relation aids in the commission of harassment which does not result in tangible
employment action. The Court viewed the issue from two different sides, reasoning
that on one hand, a supervisor is always aided by the agency relation because his or
her power and authority gives his conduct a "threatening character.." 6 On the other
hand, the Court reasoned that a supervisors harassment might be the same as that of
a co-employee and as such the supervisors status makes little difference."7
The Court attempted to avoid these tensions by reasoning that in cases of
supervisory harassment it was bound by its holding in Meritor - that agency
principles constrain the imposition of vicarious liability."" The Court determined,
however, that, although Meritor "suggested" such a limitation on liability stemmed
from agency principles, it could look at other considerations as well."9 Specifically,
the Court stated that "[t]he aided in the agency relation standard... is a developing
feature of agency law, and we hesitate to render a definitive explanation of our
understanding of the standard in an area where other important considerations must
affect our judgement."'" Looking to "other considerations," the Court reasoned that
Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment policies
and effective grievance mechanisms. Were employer liability to depend
in part on such procedures, it would effect Congress' intention to promote
conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context. To the extent
limiting employer liability could encourage employees to report harassing
conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive, it would also serve Title
VII's deterrent purpose.''
114. Id. at 2269.
115. d.
116. Id.
117. See iU.
118. See id. at 2270.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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Following this rationale, the Court held that employers may be held vicariously liable
for a supervisor's sexual harassment of a subordinate, even if the subordinate does not
suffer any tangible change in her job status."
2. Faragher
In Faragher, the Court addressed the standard of employer liability for supervisory
sexual harassment that results in a hostile environment. At the outset, the Court
recognized the difficulties the courts of appeal have had in deriving standards of
employer liability for supervisory sexual harassment since Meritor, specifically
pointing to the divergence in approaches to standards of liability under agency law.I"
While noting these difficulties, the Court reasoned that Congress had, in effect,
adopted the Court'e holding in Mertor because it had amended Title VII after
Meritor 4 without modifying the Meritor holding."a Thus, the Court began its
analysis by stating that "Meritor's statement of law is the foundation on which we
build today."'"
As it did in Burlington, the Court turned to the "aided in agency relation standard"
as the appropriate starting point for determining employer liability for hostile
environment sexual harassment, because, in some sense, a "harassing supervisor is
always assisted in his misconduct by the supervisory relationship."''  The Court
noted that the "aided in agency" standard is merely a starting point because "our
obligation here is not to make a pronouncement of agency law in general or to
transplant § 219(2)(d) [of the Restatement] into Title VII. Rather, it is to adapt agency
concepts to the practical objectives of Title VII." With the "aided in agency"
standard as the starting point, the Court reasoned:
When a fellow employee harasses, the victim can walk away or tell the
offender where to go, but it may be difficult to offer such responses to a
supervisor, whose "power to supervise - [which may be] to hire and fire,
and to set work schedules and pay rates - does not disappear... when
he chooses to harass through insults and offensive gestures rather than
directly with threats of firing or promises of promotion." Recognition of
employer liability when discriminatory misuse of supervisory authority
alters the terms and conditions of a victim's employment is underscored
by the fact that the employer has a greater opportunity to guard against
misconduct by supervisors than by common workers; employers have
122. See id.
123. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2282 (1998).
124. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, tit. 1, § 102, 105 Stat. 1072 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994)).
125. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2286.
126. Id. at 2286.
127. Id. at 2290.
128. Id. at 2291 n.3.
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greater opportunity and incentive to screen them, train them, and monitor
their performance."
However, while finding sufficient reasons to hold employers vicariously liable for
supervisory sexual harassment, Justice Souter, writing the majority opinion, refused
to recognize vicarious liability for hostile environment harassment unless the Court
could square such a holding with Meritos express limitation that an employer is not
"automatically" liable for sexual harassment caused by its supervisor.'3"
The Court articulated two alternatives that could square the holding in Meritor with
the position that a supervisor, aided in agency, can subject his employer to vicarious
liability.' The first alternative would be to require proof of an affirmative in-
vocation of supervisory authority by the harassing supervisor." The other alternative
would be to provide the employer with an affirmative defense to liability in certain
circumstances, even when an actionable hostile environment has been created by a
supervisor.'"
The Court reasoned that plaintiffs and defendants would be poorly served under the
first alternative!' because the line between affirmative and merely implicit uses of
supervisory power is too difficult to ascertain." s The Court recognized that
"[s]upervisors do not make speeches threatening sanctions whenever they make
requests in the legitimate exercise of managerial authority, and yet every subordinate
employee knows the sanctions exist."" s According to the Court, such a rule would
create a temptation to litigate, when the primary objective of Title VII is prevention
and avoidance, not redress."
The Court stated that employers need "to take all steps necessary to prevent sexual
harassment from occurring, such as... informing employees of their right to raise
and how to raise the issue of harassment."'" The Court reasoned that Title VII
would be implemented sensibly by crediting employers who make reasonable efforts
to prevent harassment and not rewarding a plaintiff who could have avoided harm but
failed to do so.'" Based on this premise, the Court held that an employer is subject
to vicarious liability for supervisory sexual harassment creating a hostile work
environment." However, to credit employers for taking reasonable efforts to prevent
harassment, the Court provided employers with an affirmative defense to liability
where an employer can prove that it took reasonable care to prevent and remedy the
129. Id. at 2290.
130. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2291.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id
134. See id. at 2292.
135. See id. at 2291.
136. Id. at 2291-92.
137. See id. at 2292.
138. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1997)).
139. See id.
140. See id. at 2292-93.
1999]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
harassment, and the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the procedures
provided by the employer.4'
IV. Analysis
In Burlington, tho Court went to great lengths to analyze agency law in developing
a rule of employer liability for supervisory sexual harassment. According to the Court,
the basis for this analysis was Congress' decision to include the term "agent" in its
definition of employer, which the Court determined to be an explicit instruction to
interpret Title VII based on agency principles." As the Court admitted, however,
looking to agency principles for guidance in defining employer liability has led to
considerable disagreement in the courts of appeal.'" After gleaning the "aided in the
agency relation standard" from the Restatement, the Court hesitated to explain it and
readily admitted that it does not fully understand the standard. For example, in
articulating a rule of vicarious liability for supervisory sexual harassment in cases
where tangible employment action is taken, the Court stated that "whatever the exact
contours of the aidel in the agency relation standard, its requirements will always be
met when a supervisor takes a tangible employment action against a subordinate. In
that instance, it wculd be implausible to interpret agency principles to allow an
employer to escape liability."'" In other words, the ends justify the means.
This failure to understand the "aided in the agency relation standard" becomes even
more evident in cases where no tangible employment action is taken. After discussing
the Restatement and its various parts, the Court stated that "[tihe aided in the agency
relation standard ... is a developing feature of agency law, and we hesitate to render
a definitive explanation of our understanding of the standard in an area where other
important considera'lons must affect our judgement."'" In this case, those "other
considerations" were, the policies that underlie Title VII. As recognized by the Court,
these policies are to deter sexual harassment in the workplace and encourage
employers to create antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms -
in short, to promote deterrence rather than- litigation.
In Faragher, the Court based its decision on those same principles of deterrence.
At first glance, it appears that Meritor and the agency law it pronounces is the
foundation on which the majority builds. It is a shaky foundation at best. Justice
Souter's majority opinion represents an attempt to distance the Court from the
principles that it pronounced in Meritor, without expressly overruling Meritor. Meritor
stood for the proposition that employer liability for supervisory sexual harassment is
to be determined from agency law principles, and expressly held that an employer
cannot be held vicariously liable for such harassment. Under Faragher, employer
liability for supervisory sexual harassment was determined based upon the objectives
141. See id. at 2293.
142. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2265 (1998).
143. See id. at 2263.
144. Id. at 2269 (emphasis added).
145. Id.
[Vol. 52:461
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol52/iss3/12
NOTES
that Title VII serves, and the Court expressly held that employers may be held
vicariously liable for such harassment.
The majority recognized at the outset that the courts of appeal have struggled under
the agency law principles expressed in MeNtor to "derive manageable standards to
govern employer liability for hostile environment" supervisory sexual harassment."
This is precisely why the Court granted certiorari. One would hope that the Court
would not base its decision in Faragher on the very principles that failed to serve their
purpose in the first instance. Fortunately, the Court did not do so. In fact, one can
infer that Justice Souter had hoped that Congress, in amending Title VII, would have
modified the Meritor decision. Justice Souter found this to be "conspicuous," and
stated that because of it, the Court was "bound" to honor Meritor.1 The Court did
so only by manipulating Meritor's principles and molding them into a reasoned
conclusion.
The Court noted in Meritor that it had admonished courts to "find guidance in the
common law of agency, as embodied in the Restatement."'' The Court claimed to
do the same in Faragher, only to the extent that it used the Restatement as a "starting
point" for determining employer liability for supervisory sexual harassment. This is
because its obligation is not "to make a pronouncement of agency law in general or
to transplant [the Restatement] into Title VII. Rather, it is to adapt agency concepts
to the practical objectives of Title VII. 'L " The Court stated that Title VII's primary
objective is prevention and avoidance, not redress. This is the foundation on which
the Court builds. The Court's objective was to implement the purposes underlying
Title VII; to do so its holding had to influence conduct.
Thus, while Mentor held that an employer cannot automatically be held liable for
supervisory sexual harassment, the Court, to realize its objectives, held that employers
may in fact be held vicariously liable. Bound by the constraints of Meritor, however,
the Court provided an affirmative defense to allow employers to escape automatic
liability. In essence, the Court's holding that employers may be held vicariously liable
for supervisory sexual harassment in hostile environment cases, subject to an
affirmative defense, influences conduct by forcing employers to take affirmative action
to prevent supervisory harassment. The necessary result was that the Court squared
its holding with Meritor, and further achieved its objectives to promote deterrence
rather than litigation.
What about the agency law concepts expressed in Meritor that the Court struggled
to make sense of in Burlington? In Faragher, the Court used those agency concepts
to explain the relationship between employers, their supervisory employees, and
subordinates, and gave a detailed summation of why employers should be held
responsible for the actions of their supervisory employees. Beyond this, however,
agency law seems to disappear in the opinion, while the objectives underlying Title
VII come to the surface. As set forth above, the recognition of vicarious liability
146. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2282.
147. See id. at 2291 n.4.
148. Id. at 2282.
149. Id. at 2291 n.3 (emphasis added).
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promotes prevention and avoidance, thus acting as a deterrent. These are the
objectives underlying Title VII. Therefore, in Faragher, the Court did not abandon
agency law as it necessarily did in Burlington, but rather manipulated its concepts into
reasons for liability, while ultimately resting liability on Title VII's objectives.
In his dissent,"S Justice Thomas took issue with the majority in Burlington and
Faragher, characterizing the majority's rule of vicarious liability as "manufa-
ctured.''. He opintd that the majority holding "is a whole-cloth creation that draws
no support from the legal principles on which the Court claims it is based."" Here,
Justice Thomas was referring to the majority's use of agency law and the "aided in the
agency relation standard." He reasoned that liability under the standard depends upon
the alleged victim's belief that her supervisor, by sexually harassing her, is conducting
official company business.'" "In this day and age, no sexually harassed employee
can reasonably believe that a harassing supervisor is conducting the official business
of the company or acting on its behalf."'" Justice Thomas further reasoned that
"[a]lthough the Court implies that it has found guidance in both precedent and statute
its holding is a product of willful policymaking, pure and simple."'' Indeed it was
- only to the extent that Burlington and Faragher implemented the policies
underlying Title VII.
One has to believe, as Justice Souter suggested, that if Congress had dealt with
Meritor and the agency principles that it embodies when it amended Title VII, the
waters would be much clearer. Instead, the Court was forced to distance itself from
agency law in Burlington and Faragher, which it accomplished with varying degrees
of success. The end result is that agency law and the Restatement are alive and well
in Title VII jurisprudence." Of course, one could argue that Burlington and
Faragher represent an attempt by the Supreme Court to please all interested entities.
With the inclusion of agency law in its analysis, the Court provides legal scholars and
academics with a subject of debate, while its holdings provide practitioners with a
seemingly straightforward test with which to litigate claims. Courts should approach
the Restatement in the context of Title VII with caution, and in doing so, take heed
to the opinion of Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals who
best described the interrelationship of the Restatement with Title VII. Judge Posner
opined that the Restatement is unworkable in the context of Title VII:
The... Restatement... was promulgated 40 years ago, before Title VII
was enacted and before the concept of sexual harassment had emerged as
a distinct legal concept. There is nary a hint in the text or legislative
150. Justice Thomas, was joined in his dissent by Justice Scalia. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2271;
Faragher, 118 S. CL at 2294.
151. Ud. at 2271 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
152. d. at 2273.
153. See iU at 2274.
154. I.
155. d. (emphasis rdded).
156. See, e.g., Wright-Simmons v. City of Oklahoma City, 155 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 1998); Harrison
v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 158; F.3d 1371 (10th Cir. 1998).
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history of Title VII that Congress intended to incorporate the Restatement
by reference. It would have been loopy to do so. The Restatements are
intended to provide a compact statement of common law principles. The
essence of the common law method of rulemaking is suppleness and
flexibility facilitating adjustment to altered circumstances, and is
inconsistent with treating any statement of common law principles as a
petrified text.'-
In Judge Posner's view, courts should look to and examine the social policies that Title
VII serves, rather than "teasing out the meaning of words in a text composed with
other problems in mind."'"
Ultimately, the Supreme Court did examine those policies. Burlington and Faragher
both recognized Title VII's purpose to deter conduct and promote internal conciliation
rather than to invite litigation in the courts by providing an act under which sexual
harassment claims may be brought. The Court's holdings in both Burlington and
Faragher implemented this purpose. Employers place their supervisors in a position
where the supervisor is cloaked with power over subordinate employees. The extent
of that power will vary from case to case, but as such, an employer has a duty to
make certain that its supervisors do not abuse this power. Additionally, employers
have a duty to provide employees with a work environment that is not consumed with
offensive conduct and where advancement is not conditioned on sexual acts. The
Supreme Court, by subjecting employers to vicarious liability, forces them to take
affirmative steps to prevent sexually harassing conduct by their supervisors."w In
cases where tangible employment action is taken, knowledge will be imputed to the
employer because such action necessarily requires a company act. As such, the
employer can take adequate measures and implement internal controls to prevent
157. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 508 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, CJ., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
158. Id. at 509. Judge Posner went further in his argument against the application of the Restatement
to Title VII, opining:
[H]ad the Supreme Court told us to use the... Restatement... as the framework for
evaluating sexual harassment under Title VII, I would bow to its command. It did not;
but by citing the Restatement [in Meritor] it gave lawyers and judges a straw to grasp at.
The straw has broken in their hand. The Restatement turns out to be hopelessly vague in
its bearing on the issue of employers' liability for sexual harassment, being vaguely
worded and addressed to other issues. So judges can in good faith reach opposite results
when they seek guidance in the Restatement to employers' liability for sexual harassment
by supervisory employees. The judges and lawyers who insist that the Restatement of
Agency is The Way either are disingenuous, wishing to conceal their true grounds of
decision, or are in the grip of the formalist belief that difficult cases can be decided by
teasing out the meaning of words in a text composed with other problems in mind,
without need to examine the social policies that the law might be thought to be serving.
Id.
159. See generally Lisa L. Fowler, Sexual Harassment Policies: An Employer's Burden or Ad-
vantage? 10 BYU J. Pu. L. 71 (1996) (proposing elements of sexual harassment policy in light of
federal antidiscrimination law); Chad W. King, Sex Love Letters, and Vicious Rumors: Anticipating New
Situations Creating Sexually Hostile Work Environment, 9 BYU J. PuB. L. 341 (1995) (suggesting how
employers can anticipate and address sexually harassing conduct in the workplace).
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supervisors from conditioning promotion, hiring, or the like on sex. Any failure to so
do may result in liability.
The Supreme Court has also placed a burden on employers to establish internal
grievance mechanisms and complaint procedures. In cases where no tangible
employment action is taken, a victimized employee has a duty to make her employer
aware of the supervisor's harassing conduct through the use of internal grievance
mechanisms and complaint procedures. Any unreasonable failure to do so will allow
the employer to escape liability. Therefore, the Court has placed a burden on the
employee to inform the employer of the harassment, allowing the employer the
opportunity to remedy the conduct or face liability."w Additionally, in placing this
burden on employees, the Court deterred frivolous and groundless sexual harassment
lawsuits by litigiou; employees who would otherwise bring such claims. Indeed, with
Burlington and Faragher, the Supreme Court swung the pendulum to the middle of
the field of supervisory sexual harassment.
V. Implications for Oklahoma Law
The implications of Burlington and Faragher for Oklahoma law are somewhat
subtle in the content of this analysis. The purpose of Part V of this note is not to
render an opinion of how Oklahoma courts should apply Burlington and Faragher, but
rather illustrate how the two cases expose the inadequacies of substantive Oklahoma
law regarding employment discrimination - more specifically, supervisory sexual
harassment.
Comparable to the federal Title VII statutes in Oklahoma is the Oklahoma Anti-
Discrimination Act."6 The stated purpose of the Oklahoma Act is to "provide for
execution within the state of Oklahoma of the policies embodied in [Title VI]."'t
By making such a broad statement of purpose, the Oklahoma Legislature has, in
effect, given Congmss the authority to dictate the policies underlying the Oklahoma
Act, such that the Oklahoma Act will constitute a state equivalent to Title VII.
The policies that embody Title VII were set forth by the Supreme Court in
Burlington and Faragher. Those policies, as analyzed in detail above, essentially
amount to deterrence and prevention, but not redress. Burlington and Faragher, by
holding employers vicariously liable for supervisory sexual harassment subject to an
affirmative defense where no tangible action is taken, necessarily influence employers
to deter and prevent harassment. Thus, by implication, the purpose of the Oklahoma
160. In cases where tangible employment action has been taken, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
has interpreted Burlington and Faragher to mean that liability is imputed on the employer, even if the
employer ultimately stops further harassment. See Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152 F.3d 1253,
1261 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 1999)
(holding that in cases where no tangible action has been taken, an employer cannot be held vicariously
liable if the employer, upon gaining knowledge of sexual harassment; moves promptly to investigate and
stop the same).
161. 25 OKLA. STAr. §§ 1101-1102 (1991); id. § 1201; i § 1301 (Supp. 1998); id. §§ 1302-1311
(1991).
162. Id. § 1101 (1991).
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Act in the context of supervisory sexual harassment is to deter and prevent such
harassment. The following analysis proceeds under this premise.
A. Federal Preemption
A threshold issue is whether Title VII preempts the Oklahoma Act. The Supreme
Court has held that federal law may preempt state law in three different ways."
First, Congress may preempt state law in express terms." Second, Congress' intent
to preempt state law "may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is
sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for supplementary state regulation.""tu Third, state law may be preempted
where it conflicts with federal law by either making compliance with federal and state
law a physical impossibility or where it stands as an obstacle to accomplishing and
executing the full purposes and objectives of Congress." The first two alternatives
may be discarded within this analysis because Congress addressed these alternatives
in Title VII, which explicitly disclaims any intent to categorically preempt state law
or to occupy the field of employment discrimination to the exclusion of state law."
Congress also addressed the third alternative in Title VII, providing that analogous
state laws are preempted by Title VII only to the extent that they conflict or are
inconsistent with Title VU.' Thus, the Oklahoma Act can be preempted by Title
VII only to the extent that it conflicts with or is inconsistent with Title VII.
In Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc.," the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Title
VII does not preempt the Oklahoma Act." Although neither party in Tate raised the
preemption issue, the court addressed it as a "critical prerequisite" to its analysis.""
While holding that Title VII did not preempt state law, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
recognized that under Title VII, state laws will be preempted only when they conflict
163. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1987).
164. See id.
165. Ld.
166. See id. at 281.
167. See id. Title VII provides:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent on the
part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title operates to the exclusion of
State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be construed
as invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is inconsistent with any
of the purposes of this Act, or any provisions thereof.
42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1994).
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any
liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any State
or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to require or
permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this
subchapter.
Id. § 2000e-7.
168. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 281.
169. 833 P.2d 1218 (Okla. 1992).
170. See id. at 1222.
171. Id.
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with Title VII.'7' In holding that Title VII did not preempt Oklahoma state law, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, paraphrasing the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that Title
VII is a floor "beneath which federally provided protection may not drop rather than
a ceiling above which it may not rise."" The court recognized that remedies for
employment discrimination under state law may be both different from and broader
than those providel by Title VII." Thus, accepting the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
holding that Title VII does not preempt the Oklahoma Act and that remedies under
the Oklahoma Act may be different from those under Title VII, the analysis turns to
remedies.75
B. A Statutory Private Right of Action
The major diffeience between Title VII and the Oklahoma Act is remedial. Title
VII provides a private right of action for employment discrimination" as well as
compensatory and punitive damages.'" The only private right of action provided by
the Oklahoma Act, in the context of employment discrimination, is for discrimination
based on handicap." Any other remedies for employment discrimination under the
Oklahoma Act are administrative.1'
The Oklahoma Human Rights Commission is the state agency charged with
enforcing claims brought under the Oklahoma Act.' The Commission is vested with
the power to receive, investigate, conciliate, hold hearings on, and pass upon
complaints alleging violations of the Oklahoma Act.'' The Commission may seek
enforcement of its orders in court and its decisions are subject to judicial review. The
172. See id.
173. Id at 1222-23 (citing Guerra, 479 U.S. at 285).
174. See id at 1223. An Illinois court held that Burlington and Faraglier did not apply to its state's
Human Rights Act becruse the state act imputed strict liability on employers regardless of whether the
employer knew of the offending conduct, whereas Title VII recognizes that employers are not
automatically liable based on Burlington and Faragher. See Webb v. Lustig, 700 N.E.2d 220, 227 (Il1.
Ct. App. 1998). Thus, the state act recognized broader relief to the exclusion of federal law.
175. Though the Oklahoma Supreme Court reached the correct result regarding preemption, one has
to question the clarity cf its reasoning, particularly in light of the fact that the court took it upon itself
to address the issue. The court's reasoning gives the false impression that a state's remedial scheme
cannot be more restrictive than that provided by Title VI1 while its holding states that the same may be
both different from and broader than Title VII. Perhaps the court should have stated that state protection
from discrimination cannot conflict with Title VII by permitting that which Title VII does not, but may
provide greater protection by permitting less than Title VII allows. See supra note 167. Such a statement
would have clarified the court's reference to Title VII being a "floor" rather than "ceiling." Thereafter,
the ultimate conclusion that a state's remedial scheme may be both different from and broader than Title
VII, would not imply that such a scheme may not provide for more restrictive enforcement procedures
than those provided by Title VII. Stated in more simplified terms, state law cannot permit more than
Title VII allows, but a Ftate's remedial scheme may be different from Title VII.
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1994).
177. See id § 1981a.
178. See 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1901 (Supp. 1998); see also Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d
1218, 1229 (Okla. 1992); Williams v. Dub Ross Co., 895 P.2d 1344, 1346 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
179. See 25 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1501-1508 (Supp. 1998).
180. See id § 1501.
181. See id § 1501(A)(3).
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relief provided by the Oklahoma Act includes temporary injunctions and restraining
orders,"u cease and desist orders, the hiring or reinstatement of employees, and costs
and attorneys fees." The Oklahoma Act does not provide for compensatory or
punitive damages. Thus, the remedies provided by the Oklahoma Act are sufficiently
limited in comparison to those provided by Title VII. However, simply because the
statute does not provide for a private right of action does not mean that such action
is foreclosed in Oklahoma because Oklahoma recognizes the public policy, common
law tort action.
C. The Common Law Tort Action
Oklahoma courts have long followed the at-will rule in employment. Generally
stated, this rule holds that an employer may discharge an employee for good cause or
no cause without being guilty of a legal wrong.'" In the 1989 case Burk v. K-Mart
Corp., the Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted the public policy exception to the
at-will termination rule." The court held that this exception will apply only in a
narrow class of cases in which the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public
policy as set forth in constitutional, statutory, or case law.17
Turning back to Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., the main issue before the
Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether a retaliatory discharge upon an employee's
complaint of racial discrimination was actionable under the Burk public policy
exception." The court answered in the affirmative and held that such a
discrimination claim was actionable as a "state law claim for tortious employment
discrimination under Burk."'19
The Tate court began its reasoning with the premise that a racially motivated
discharge comes under the protection of Burk because such action clearly offends
public policy."' The court noted that the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act does
not provide a private right of action for individuals aggrieved by racial discrimination
and that such claims are properly brought before the Oklahoma Human Rights
Commission."n The court articulated two reasons for holding that a common law tort
action existed under Oklahoma common law. First, the court reasoned that Oklahoma
182. See id. § 1502.1.
183. See id. § 1505.
184. See Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 26 (Okla. 1989).
185. 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989).
186. See Burk, 770 P.2d at 28. See generally Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Oklahoma's At-Will Rule:
Heeding the Warnings of America's Evolving Employment Law?, 39 OKLA. L. REv. 373 (1986)
(examining Oklahoma law against decisions in other jurisdictions redefining the at-will presumption).
187. See Burk, 770 P.2d at 28.
188. 833 P.2d 1218 (Okla. 1992).
189. See id. at 1225.
190. I. at 1230-31. See generally Brad Rogers Carson, Note, Labor Law: Tate v. Browning-Ferris
Industries: Oklahoma Creates a Common Law Action for Employment Discrimination, 46 OKLA. L. REv.
557 (1993) (analyzing the impact of Tate on the employment relationship in Oklahoma and providing
an analytical framework within which to evaluate the relationship).
191. See Tate, 833 P.2d at 1225.
192. See id. at 1229.
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law does not allow legislative abrogation of common law by implication, and as such
the legislature would have to textually express its desire to occupy a field of
discrimination law to the exclusion of all other law." Since the legislature did not
express this desire within the statute, the court found the state tort action under the
public policy exception supplemental to the Oklahoma Act." Second, the court
reasoned that because a private right of action was provided in the Oklahoma Anti-
Discrimination Act only for discrimination based on handicap, a holding that the
statute established the sole remedy for racial discrimination would "create a
dichotomous division of discrimination remedies contrary to . . . the Oklahoma
Constitution." " The court stated that the Oklahoma Constitution "absolutely
interdicts the passage of special law that would sanction disparate remedies for those
who complain of employment discrimination.''
Four years later in List v. Anchor Paint Manufacturing, Co., the Oklahoma
Supreme Court distinguished Tate by holding that the public policy exception did not
create a state law tort action in the case of a constructive discharge based on age
discrimination. In List, the plaintiff employee, C.R. List, claimed he was demoted
because of his age and that such demotion was an attempt to create working
conditions that were so intolerable that they would force his resignation."' As a
result, List, claiming his work environment was intolerable, resigned and brought
action against his former employer based on the Burk tort exception to the
employment at-wilt doctrine.'" List claimed that his employer's actions constituted
a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy as set forth in the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act.'a
The Oklahoma Supreme Court distinguished Tate from the situation in List, noting
that while similar in some respects, the two cases differ significantly." The List
court found similarities in that both the plaintiffs in Tate and List claimed violation
of their rights as Frotected by federal antidiscrimination statutes.' Distinguishing
the cases, the court reasoned that the statutory remedies available to the plaintiff in
Tate were significantly limited compared to those available to the plaintiff in List.'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized that had it held in Tate that the plaintiff
was not entitled to assert a common law cause of action, he would have had no right
to a jury trial because neither the Oklahoma Act nor the federal act provided for such
a remedy. Consequently, his remedies would have been limited to back pay and he
would have had no right to additional compensatory or punitive damages.' The
193. See iU) at 1225-26.
194. See id. at 1230-31.
195. Id. at 1229.
196. Id. at 1230.
197. 910 P.2d 1011 (Okla. 1996).
198. See id. at 1013.
199. See i).
200. See i.
201. See id.
202. See iU)
203. See id.
204. See id. Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to provide forcompensatory and punitive damages
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court reasoned that the plaintiff in List, however, would be entitled to a jury trial and
punitive damages, and thus was afforded -greater statutory remedies than the plaintiff
in Tate because the statutes governing age discrimination provided for such action.
Therefore, because List had adequate remedies for age discrimination under statute,
the court would not extend the Burk common law exception to age discrimination
claims.'
Having addressed racial and age discrimination in Tate and List, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's focus turned to sexual harassment in Marshall v. OK Rental &
Leasing, Inc.' In Marshall, the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered a hostile
environment sexual harassment claim under Burk, and held that such a claim was not
cognizable under the Burk exception because the plaintiff had adequate statutory
remedies.'
The plaintiff, Jody Marshall, brought action against her employer claiming she was
constructively discharged from her employment because she was sexually harassed by
a co-worker.0 The court found that its analysis in List controlled - that where the
"employee has an adequate statutory cause of action for wrongful discharge which is
sufficient to protect ... her rights, that remedy is exclusive and no common law
remedy is available under Burk."2"' The court followed the reasoning of the
Maryland Court of Appeals, opining that allowing Marshall to bring a common law
tort action under the Burk public policy exception would be a misuse of the
exception.2 " The court stated:
In cases of discharge motivated by employment discrimination prohibited
by Title VII and [state antidiscrimination statutes] the statutes create both
the right, by way of an exception to the terminable at-will doctrine, and
remedies for enforcing that exception. Thus, the generally accepted reason
for recognizing the [public policy exception] tort, that of vindicating an
otherwise civilly unremedied public policy violation, does not apply.
Further, allowing full tort damages to be claimed in the name of
vindicating the statutory public policy goals upsets the balance between
right and remedy struck by the Legislature in establishing the very policy
relied upon 212
The Oklahoma Supreme Court reasoned that an employee who alleges she was
constructively discharged due to a hostile work environment created by sexual
which were not available at the time of Tate. See Pub. L. 102-166, tit. 1, § 102, 105 Stat. 1072 (1991)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994)).
205. See List, 910 P.2d at 1013.
206. See iUL
207. 939 P.2d 1116 (Okla. 1997).
208. See id. at 1119.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 1120.
211. See id. at 1121.
212. Id. at 1121-22 (quoting Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 561 A.2d 179, 190 (Md. Ct. App.
1989)).
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harassment has adequate remedies under Title VII because Title VII allows for trial
by jury and compensatory as well as punitive damages.! 3 Therefore, with adequate
remedies provided by statute, the court did not extend the Burk exception to claims
for hostile work environment sexual harassment.'"
While Marshall was a hostile environment claim based on sexual harassment by a
co-worker, the Oklahoma Supreme Court's analysis and holding apply equally to
claims based on supervisory sexual harassment. An individual alleging supervisory
sexual harassment may bring a claim under Title VII, which, as set forth by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Marshall, provides for adequate remedies of trial by jury
and compensatory and punitive damages. Therefore, based on the reasoning of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, the Burk exception will not apply to claims for supervisory
sexual harassment.
D. The End Result
As set forth in detail above, in Burlington and Faragher, the Supreme Court based
its rulings on the polices underlying Title VII. Those policies are to influence conduct,
to deter sexual harassment in the workplace, and encourage employers to create
antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms. The Supreme Court's
holdings in Burlington and Faragher serve to implement this policy of deterrence by
holding employers vicariously liable for supervisory sexual harassment. What gave
teeth to the Supreme Court's holdings in Burlington and Faragher are the remedies
provided by Title VII - private right of action2 5 and compensatory and punitive
damages! 6
By implication, the purpose of the Oklahoma Act in the context of supervisory
sexual harassment, is to deter and prevent such harassment. The question then
becomes whether or not the Oklahoma Act works to deter sexual harassment in the
workplace and encourage employers to create antiharassment policies and effective
grievance mechanisms. The short answer is that it does not because the Act does not
have the same teeth as Title VII.
The administrative remedies provided by the Act, while nothing to ignore, are
certainly not going to influence conduct to the same extent as Title VII, given the fact
that neither a private right of action nor compensatory or punitive damages are
available under the Oklahoma Act or the Burk exception. Vicarious liability under
Burlington and Faragher mean nothing to employers if the statute which provides the
basis for the claim provides nothing more than mere administrative remedies. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized as much in Tate and List, reasoning that without
a right to a jury trial and compensatory or punitive damages, a plaintiffs remedies
would have been limited to the administrative slap on the hand provided by the
Oklahoma Act.
213. See id. at 1122.
214. See id
215. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994).
216. See id. § 1981a.
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Thus, the only logical conclusion is that the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act has
failed its stated purpose to create a state equivalent to Title VII. This should not be
cause for alarm, however, because common sense dictates that Oklahoma employers
will not harass employers with reckless abandon because of the inadequacy of
Oklahoma's antidiscrimination laws. Title VII does not allow for such a result, as any
individual could bring action in federal or state court under Title VII.217 However,
should the Oklahoma Legislature amend the Oklahoma Act to provide for a private
right of action? Alternatively, should the Oklahoma Supreme Court recognize a
common law tort action under the Burk exception? One can infer that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court does not think so in either case. With Title VII providing adequate
remedies for any individual in Oklahoma of which to avail themselves, there is no
need for a private right of action or a common law tort action under the Burk
exception. Perhaps the Oklahoma Supreme Court is correct in this assertion. An
aggrieved individual would be better off in federal district court where the judges are
more familiar than state courts with employment discrimination claims. However, to
the extent that the Oklahoma Act fails in implementing its stated purpose of
deterrence, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Burlington and Faragher, it is
something the Legislature should address, lest it leave an ineffective law on the books.
VI. Conclusion
In Burlington and Faragher, the Supreme Court implemented the policies
underlying Title VII, which are to promote conciliation, avert litigation, and deter
sexual harassment in the workplace. While the Court went to great lengths analyzing
agency law, the end result appears straightforward in application. The Court held that
an employer may be held vicariously liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment of an
employee, even if the employee does not suffer any tangible change in her
employment status. The Court provided an affirmative defense to employers in cases
where no tangible employment action is taken. Under this defense an employer must
prove that it took reasonable care to prevent and correct sexual harassment and that
the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the procedures provided by the
employer.
In establishing this rule, the Court has swung the pendulum to the middle, placing
a burden on employers to enact policies, procedures, and grievance mechanisms
geared towards deterring, preventing, and providing remedies for sexual harassment
in the workplace. In cases where no tangible employment action is taken, an employer
does not necessarily have knowledge that the offending conduct has taken place. Thus,
those employees claiming to be victims of supervisory harassment in such cases must
take the initiative to apprise their employer, giving the employer the opportunity to
remedy the problem. In the end, the Supreme Court has served the interests of both
parties as companies make it their business to implement the advice of Peters and
217. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 825 (1990) (holding that state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII claims).
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Waterman - that all are treated with dignity and respect, and ultimately it is the
companies that move closer to achieving excellence.
Bryan J. Pattison
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